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Abstract 
The two most intriguing anomalies in currency markets are: 1) the implied volatility smile in 
currency options, and 2) the forward discount bias in currency exchange rates. I show that if 
currency options are valued in analogy with the underlying currency and beliefs are heterogeneous, 
then the forward discount bias causes the smile. The analogy based currency option pricing formula 
is put forward, which converges to Garman-Kohlhagen formula if there is no forward discount bias. 
In the presence of the forward discount bias, an increase in belief dispersion increases the slope as 
well as the curvature of the smile. 
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Analogy Based Valuation of Currency Options 
 
Arguably, the most popular currency option pricing model among traders is the Garman-Kohlhagen 
model, which is the Black Scholes model (see Black and Scholes (1973)) suitably modified for 
currency options (See Garman and Kohlhagen (1983)). The existence of the implied volatility smile 
in currency options is inconsistent with the model. If the model is correct then implied volatility 
should not vary with strike, however, at-the-money currency options typically have lower implied 
volatility than in-the-money and out-of-the-money options. 
Another intriguing anomaly is the existence of the forward discount bias in exchange rates, 
which means that the forward exchange rate is empirically found to be a biased predictor of future 
spot rate.  Forward exchange rate is equal to the spot exchange rate adjusted for the interest rate 
differential between the two currencies. It predicts that a currency with a higher interest rate should 
depreciate against a currency with a lower interest rate. In reality, the opposite is typically observed. 
This finding is well documented and robust across all major currency pairs. See Lewis (1995), and 
Engel (1996) for a survey of research in this area. 
The above mentioned puzzles of implied volatility smile and the forward discount bias seem 
unrelated; however, there may be a close connection between them. I show that if the risk of buying 
a currency call option is perceived as similar to the risk of investing in the underlying currency, and 
beliefs are heterogeneous, then the forward discount bias in exchange rates leads to the smile. 
Hence, the observed smile may be a manifestation of the forward discount bias in currency options 
when beliefs are heterogeneous. Furthermore, when belief dispersion increases, the slope as well as 
the curvature of the smile increases. This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that 
heterogeneous beliefs are an important determinant of the shape of the implied volatility smile in 
currency options. See Beber, A., Buraschi, A., and Breedon, F. (2010).  
This article puts forward the associated option pricing formula, termed the analogy based 
currency option pricing formula. The new formula contains the Garman-Kohlhagen formula as a 
special case. Specifically, analogy formula converges to the Garman-Kohlhagen formula if the 
marginal investor in options does not display the forward discount bias. 
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The Black Scholes model assumes that markets are informationally efficient in the sense that 
risk adjusted return from a currency option is equal to the risk adjusted return from the underlying 
currency itself. A pre-requisite for informational efficiency is that all risks are correctly perceived. 
However, risk is a highly subjective notion, and the argument that risks are often misperceived in 
significant ways even when stakes are high is frequently made. See Rotheli (2010), Bhattacharya, 
Goldman, & Sood (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), and Barberis & Thaler (2002) among many 
others. 
In laboratory experiments, it has been found that subjects consider the risk of a call option 
as similar to the risk of the underlying asset, and value the call option in analogy with the underlying 
asset by equating their expected returns. See Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2012), and Siddiqi (2011). 
Furthermore, it is common to find practitioners with decades of experience arguing that a call 
option is a surrogate for the underlying asset suggesting strong field relevance of the laboratory 
findings.1 
The relevance of analogy making for human thinking process has long been acknowledged. 
Hume wrote in 1748, “From causes which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our 
experimental conclusions”. (Hume 1748, Section IV). Cognitive scientists and psychologists argue that 
analogy making is the core of cognition and the fuel and fire of thinking (see Hofstadter and Sander 
(2013)). Hofstadter and Sander (2013) write, “[…] at every moment of our lives, our concepts are selectively 
triggered by analogies that our brain makes without letup, in an effort to make sense of the new and unknown in terms 
of the old and known.” (Hofstadter and Sander (2013), Prologue page1). 
 Analogy making is the act of perceiving two non-identical situations or objects as the same 
at some abstract level (see Mitchell. M. (2001)).  The analogy between a call option and its 
underlying asset is very tempting as their payoffs are strongly related. It should not come as a 
surprise that call options are considered surrogates of the underlying assets and their risks are 
deemed similar both by experienced market professionals as well as participants in laboratory 
experiments.  
                                                          
1
 A few examples of investment professionals arguing that a call option is a surrogate for the underlying asset are: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/stock-replacement-strategy-reduce-risk-142949569.html 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, 
http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/ 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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 Shouldn’t rational arbitrageurs make money at the expense of such analogy makers? Such 
arbitraging is difficult if not impossible in the presence of transaction costs. An important argument 
in the behavioral finance literature (see Barberis and Thaler (2002)) is that the absence of “free 
lunch” does not imply that prices are right due to limits to arbitrage including transaction costs. In 
our context, the presence of transaction costs is likely to eliminate any “free lunch” at the expense of 
analogy makers. It is worth mentioning that bid-ask spreads in at-the-money currency options are 
typically of the order of 5 to 8% of the option price, and spreads are typically 10 to 15% of the 
option price in out-of-the-money currency options. In continuous time, no matter how small the 
transaction costs are, the total cost of replicating an option grows without bound. See Soner, Shreve, 
and Cvitanic (1995). In discrete time, transaction costs are bounded, however, a no-arbitrage interval 
is created. If analogy price lies within the interval, analogy makers cannot be arbitraged away. The 
interval gets larger as the required frequency of replicating portfolio adjustments increases. If the 
underlying currency follows jump diffusion and/or stochastic volatility, then the replicating portfolio 
argument fails regardless of transaction costs, and analogy makers cannot be arbitraged away. 
 Siddiqi (2014) studies the implications of analogy making for equity index options and shows 
that it provides a unified explanation for a number of puzzles such as the implied volatility skew, 
superior performance of covered call writing, and worse than expected performance of zero beta 
straddles. Siddiqi (2015) extends the notion of analogy making to commodity options and shows 
that it provides an explanation for the various types of skews observed in commodity options.   
 This article extends the analogy argument to currency options. It puts forward an analogy 
based currency option pricing formula that provides an explanation for the implied volatility smile in 
currency options. It contains Garman-Kohlhagen formula as a special case. The analogy formula 
converges to Garman-Kohlhagen formula if there is no forward discount bias and there are no 
transaction costs.  If the analogy formula is correct, then the forward discount bias and the implied 
volatility smile in currency options are the two sides of the same coin. It is interesting that the same 
idea of considering a call option to be a surrogate for the underlying asset provides explanations for 
diverse puzzles across very different markets (equity, commodity, and currency). 
 The central prediction of asset pricing theory is: 
         
 
           
                                                                                               (0.1) 
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Where    and    denote the return on a risky asset and the return on the risk free asset respectively. 
Equation (0.1) shows that the return that a subjective expected utility maximizer expects from a risky 
asset depends on his belief about the covariance of the asset’s return with his marginal utility of 
consumption.  
An analogy maker is a subjective expected utility maximizer who believes that the covariance of a currency 
call option’s return with his marginal utility of consumption is equal to the covariance of the underlying currency’s 
return with his marginal utility of consumption. Consequently, the return he expects from a currency call 
option is equal to his subjective assessment of the expected return available on the underlying 
currency. 
An analogy maker perceives the quantity of risk in a currency call option to be equivalent to 
the quantity of risk involved in investing in the underlying currency. One may re-write (0.1) as: 
        
  
              (0.2) 
Where    
               
             
  and    
             
           
 
 
Clearly, for a given subjective expected utility maximizer, the (subjectively perceived) risk adjusted 
returns across all risky assets should be equal to  , which is his (subjective) price of risk. An analogy 
maker equates the perceived quantity of risk in a currency call option (measured by   of call) with the 
perceived quantity of risk involved in buying the underlying currency outright (measured by   of the 
underlying stock).   
 Analogy making is related to the literature on mental accounting. Mental accounting, a term 
coined in Thaler (1980), is a broad concept. Thaler (1999) defines mental accounting as a set of 
cognitive operations used by individuals to organize, evaluate and keep track of financial activities. 
Analogy making is a special type of mental accounting in which a call option is classified in the same 
risk category as the underlying asset.   
This paper is organized as follows: Section 1 develops the analogy based currency option 
pricing formula in continuous time.  It shows that Garman-Kohlhagen formula is a special case 
corresponding to the absence of forward discount bias and transaction costs. Section 2 shows that if 
the forward discount bias exists in the presence of diverse beliefs, implied volatility smile arises in 
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currency options. Section 3 discusses the impact of analogy making on comparative statistics of 
interest for currency options. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Analogy Making and the Value of Currency Options 
 
An analogy maker equates the return he expects from a currency call option to his subjective 
assessment of the expected return from holding the underlying currency as he perceives their risks to 
be similar.  
Suppose the marginal investor in a currency call option with a strike of   is an analogy 
maker. If   denotes the domestic currency price of a call option on one unit of foreign currency,   
is the expected percentage appreciation in the domestic currency price of foreign currency, and    is 
the foreign interest rate on a risk free bond, then over a time interval   : 
     
 
                                                                                                                               (1.1) 
That is, the expected return from holding the foreign currency is    the drift of the exchange rate 
(domestic units per foreign unit), plus risk free interest rate earned from holding the foreign 
currency in a risk free asset such as foreign treasury notes. 
 All the assumptions of the Black Scholes (Garman-Kohlhagen) model are maintained except 
for one assumption. Here, the transaction costs are allowed whereas the Black Scholes model 
requires that transaction costs must be zero. As mentioned earlier, it is well known that the Black 
Scholes argument fails when transaction costs are allowed as the cost of replicating an option grows 
without bound. See Soner et al (1995). 
 If    is the percentage transaction cost of investing in foreign currency, and    is the 
percentage transaction cost of buying a currency call option, then (1.1) can be re-written as: 
     
 
                                                                                                               (1.2) 
Foreign currency markets are perhaps the most liquid markets in the world with small 
transaction costs; however, currency option markets have transaction costs which are quite large. As 
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mentioned earlier, typically, the bid-ask spreads in currency options are of the order of 5 to 8% of 
option price in ATM options, and the spreads are around 10 to 15% of the option price in deep 
OTM options. Hence,    is much larger than   . For simplicity, I ignore   . Hence, (1.2) can be 
written as: 
     
 
                                                                                                                     (1.2a) 
I assume that the spot exchange rate (domestic units per foreign unit) follows geometric 
Brownian motion with drift   and standard deviation equal to  : 
                                                                                                                        (1.3) 
Equations (1.2a) and (1.3) are sufficient to arrive at a partial differential equation (PDE) that 
a currency call option must satisfy under analogy making. The associated PDE is described in 
proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 If analogy making determines the price of a European currency call option in 
the presence of transaction costs, then its price must satisfy the following PDE: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                      (1.4) 
With the boundary condition that at expiry, which is at time  , the value of a European call 
option with a strike of   is given by:              
Proof. 
See Appendix A. 
▄ 
 
It is interesting to note that (1.4) is equal to the Garman-Kohlhagen PDE/Black Scholes PDE for 
currency options if there is no forward discount bias, and transaction costs are zero. To see this 
clearly, note that the forward exchange rate at time   for exchange at time      is given by: 
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                                                                                                                                 (1.5) 
Where    the domestic risk free interest rate, and   denotes the forward exchange rate. If the 
forward rate is an unbiased predictor of future spot rate, that is,            , then one may write: 
                                                                                                           (1.6) 
Substituting (1.6) in (1.4) and equating    to zero, one gets: 
  
  
         
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                       (1.7) 
(1.7) is the Garman-Kohlhagen/Black Scholes PDE for currency call options. 
 By using a similar method to what is used in solving the Black Scholes PDE, the analogy 
based PDE given in (1.4) can be solved to recover an option pricing formula for a currency call 
option under analogy making. Proposition 2 presents the formula. By using put-call parity, the price 
of a currency put option is also obtained. 
 
Proposition 2 If analogy making determines the price of a currency call option in the 
presence of transaction costs, then the corresponding European call option pricing formula 
is: 
                          
                                                                         (1.8) 
Where    
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 and    
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 
Proof. 
See Appendix B. 
▄ 
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Corollary 2.1 The price of a corresponding European put option under analogy making is 
given by: 
                                          
                                   (1.9) 
Proof. 
Follows from put-call parity for exchange rate options. 
▄ 
 
It is easy to see that (1.8) and (1.9) contain the corresponding Garman-Kohlhagen formulas as a 
special case, which is obtained when         and     . 
 
1.1 Analogy Making and Arbitrage 
Can arbitrage profits be made against analogy makers? In continuous time, the presence of 
transaction costs, no matter how small, makes the Black Scholes/Garman-Kohlhagen formula 
irrelevant as the cost of replication grows without bound (see Soner et al (1995)). Hence, analogy 
makers cannot be arbitraged away in this case. 
 In discrete time, the cost of replication is bounded, however, it grows very fast as the 
frequency of portfolio adjustments required for successful replication of an option increases. Add to 
this the comparatively large transaction costs involved in trading currency options, and the 
possibility of running a successful arbitrage scheme seems extremely unlikely if not impossible. 
 It’s true the market of buying and selling currencies has one of the lowest transaction costs 
in financial markets; however, it’s also true that, unlike currencies themselves, the transaction costs 
in the market for options on currencies are perhaps among the highest. As mentioned earlier, ATM 
currency options have bid-ask spreads in the range of 5 to 8% of option price, and OTM currency 
options have typical spreads of around 8 to 15% of the option price. These costs alone are large 
enough to make arbitraging quite difficult even if other transaction costs are ignored. 
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 If the underlying currency does not follow geometric Brownian motion, then the portfolio 
replication argument fails. In that case, even if all transaction costs are assumed away, arbitrage 
profits cannot be made against analogy makers. Analogy making does not require geometric 
Brownian motion and works equally well with other possibilities such as jump diffusion or stochastic 
volatility.  Geometric Brownian motion is assumed here because it’s the simplest framework in 
which the influence of analogy making can be expressed. Analogy maker is a subjective expected 
utility maximizer who considers a call option to be a surrogate for the underlying asset irrespective 
of the stochastic process followed by the underlying asset. For an example of analogy making with 
jump diffusion and stochastic volatility, when the underlying is an equity index, see Siddiqi (2014), 
and for an example of analogy making with jump diffusion, when the underlying is a commodity, see 
Siddiqi (2015).   
  
 2. The Implied Volatility Smile 
If exchange rate beliefs are heterogeneous and are in accordance with the forward discount bias, 
then the analogy formula generates the implied volatility smile. This is consistent with empirical 
evidence that heterogeneous exchange rate beliefs are an important determinant of the shape of the 
implied volatility smile. See Beber, A., Buraschi, A., and Breedon, F. (2010). 
 Survey evidence clearly suggests that people hold diverse beliefs regarding exchange rate 
movements (see the dataset in Beber et al (2010)). Furthermore, these diverse beliefs are biased as 
average expectation points to an appreciation when the forward rate suggests a depreciation and 
vice-versa. To take a concrete example, suppose the domestic interest rate is 1% per annum, and 
foreign interest rate is 3% per annum. The forward rate would suggest depreciation in the foreign 
currency of around 2% per annum to offset the arbitrage opportunity arising from the interest rate 
advantage in the foreign currency. However, actual average investor expectations would generally 
point to an appreciation of around 2%; hence, the expectations are biased in comparison with the 
forward rate. 
 Continuing with the above example, there are many ways in which biased beliefs relative to 
the forward rate can be distributed across marginal investors in call options as moneyness changes. 
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One expects more optimistic investors to self-select into higher strike calls. Two examples are 
shown in table 1: 
 
Table 1 
Moneyness (K/S)                             Low Belief Dispersion                 High Belief Dispersion 
                                                        (% appreciation expected)          (% appreciation expected) 
0.9 0.5% 0% 
0.95 1% 0.5% 
1.0 2% 1.0% 
1.05 4% 4% 
1.1 8% 9% 
 
In the low dispersion example, as the name suggests, beliefs are comparatively less dispersed around 
the average belief, when compared with the high dispersion example (see Table 1), assuming that all 
beliefs have equal frequencies (20%). The average absolute deviation from the mean belief is 2.32% 
in the low dispersion example, whereas the corresponding deviation in the high dispersion example 
is 2.88%. 
Continuing with the same example, the following parameter values are chosen for illustrative 
purposes:  
                                    .  
It does not matter what specific numbers are chosen here. As long as the belief of each marginal investor is 
biased in the direction of the forward discount bias, and more optimistic investors self-select into higher strike calls, the 
implied volatility smile is generated. 
 Figure 1 shows the implied volatility smile generated in this example.  
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Figure 1 
 
It is interesting to note two things in figure 1. Firstly, as belief dispersion increases, the curvature of 
the smile increases. Secondly, as belief dispersion increases, the slope of the smile increases as well. 
Both features are in line with empirical evidence on the impact of belief dispersion on currency 
smiles. See Beber et al (2010).  
It is easy to construct the opposite example in which domestic interest rate is larger than 
foreign interest rate. Suppose the domestic interest rate is 3% and the foreign interest rate is 1%. 
The forward rate suggests an appreciation of 2% in the foreign currency. However, investors would 
expect depreciation in the foreign currency, making put options attractive. Appealing to foreign 
currency symmetries, a put option on foreign currency is equivalent to a call option on domestic 
currency, which is expected to appreciate. (1.8) can be used to price a call option in the domestic 
currency by redefining spot rate and strike appropriately, and using the domestic interest rate in 
place of foreign interest rate. As long as the beliefs are biased in the direction of the forward 
discount bias, and more optimistic investors self-select into higher strike calls, smiles similar to 
figure 1 are generated in this case. 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.17 
0.18 
0.19 
0.2 
0.875 0.925 0.975 1.025 1.075 1.125 
Implied Volatility (Low Belief 
Dispersion) 
Implied  Volatility (High Belief 
Dispersion) 
K/S 
Implied Volatility Smile 
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It’s easy to verify that a necessary condition for generating the smile is the existence of the 
forward discount bias. This necessary condition combined with the realization that more optimistic 
investors self-select into higher strike calls generates the smile. Hence, with analogy making, the 
smile is a manifestation of the forward discount bias in currency markets. 
 If beliefs are unbiased with respect to the forward rate, the analogy formula converges to the 
Garmen-Kohlhagen formula. Clearly, the smile disappears and is replaced by a flat line in this case. 
What happens when the beliefs are biased in the direction of the forward rate? That is, what 
happens when the forward rate suggests an appreciation, and beliefs are biased in the direction of 
the appreciation, instead of the being biased in the opposite direction as in figure 1? For the purpose 
of illustration, suppose the domestic interest rate is 3%, and the foreign interest rate is 1%. The 
forward rate suggests an appreciation of 2% in the foreign currency. Suppose beliefs are biased in 
the direction of appreciation. Specifically, consider the same beliefs as given in Table 1.  Figure 2 
plots the associated implied volatility given the beliefs in Table 1. The forward skew (implied 
volatility monotonically rises with strike) is seen, which does not conform to the observed typical 
smile in currency options. 
 
 
Figure 2 
0.1 
0.11 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 
Implied Volatility (Low Belief 
Dispersion) 
Implied Volatility (High Belief 
Dispersion) 
K/S 
Implied Volatility 
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The existence of the forward discount bias is required to generate the smile. No bias means 
no smile, and bias in the same direction as the forward rate, generates forward skew.  
The shape of the smile carries useful information about the distribution of the bias in 
investor population. As figure 1 shows, an increase in belief dispersion increases the curvature as 
well as the slope of the smile. Hence, curvature and slope carry useful information regarding how 
diverse investor beliefs are.  
 
3. Comparative Statics 
For the purpose of hedging risks arising from currency option exposure, partial derivatives of (1.8) 
and (1.9) are of special interest with ‘hedge ratio’ being of prime importance: 
  
  
                                                                                                                     (3.1) 
As, exchange rate expectations are generally in the opposite direction to what the interest rate 
differential suggests, the Garman-Kohlhagen formula potentially under-estimates the hedge ratio 
when      , and it potentially over-estimates the hedge ratio when      . Getting the hedge 
ratio right is of key importance to currency option traders, and they are potentially exposed to large 
losses without it. 
 Some other partial derivatives are: 
  
  
                                                                                                                (3.2) 
  
  
                                                                                                         (3.3) 
  
   
                                                                                                                                      (3.4) 
  
   
                                  
                                               (3.5) 
  
      
          
                              
                      
                                                                         
             
     
                  (3.6)                                                                                          
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To a speculator interested in taking directional bets on exchange rates, these partial 
derivatives are important as they constitute the risk constraints in a linear programming problem.2 If 
prices are determined in accordance with the analogy formula, and Garman-Kohlhagen formula is 
used to estimate these partial derivatives, quite a few additional problems arise apart from getting the 
hedge ratio wrong as mentioned earlier.  
Firstly, exchange rate expectations have no direct impact in Garman-Kohlhagen setting 
beyond their impact on spot rate, whereas under analogy making, an increase in expected 
appreciation directly increases the value of currency call options as (3.3) shows, over and above any 
indirect impact on the spot rate. 
Secondly, in sharp contrast with Garman-Kohlhagen formula, an increase in domestic 
interest rate does not directly affect the call price. Of course, there are indirect effects due to impacts 
on exchange rate expectations as well as the spot rate. An increase in foreign interest rates has a 
negative impact on call price in Garman-Kohlhagen formula, whereas the impact is ambiguous 
under analogy making, and can be positive for out-of-the-money call options. 
Thirdly, the impact of option life on call price is dependent on exchange rate expectations as 
(3.6) shows. If both foreign and domestic interest rates are zero, Garman-Kohlhagen formula 
predicts an increase in option life would increase call option value. Under analogy making, the 
impact depends on the direction of exchange rate expectations. 
Last but not the least, the presence of transaction costs dampens the magnitude of nearly all 
partial derivatives. The transaction costs are smaller for ATM options when compared with OTM 
options. Hence, ignoring them has an asymmetric impact on the linear programming problem facing 
the speculator. 
The partial derivatives of put option are similarly obtained from (1.9) and they have opposite 
signs. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 See Rendlemen (2002) (Chapter 7) for details on setting up linear programming problems associated with 
directional bets. 
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4. Conclusions 
People choose which options to buy based on subjective reasons. This fact compels one to think 
that investor expectations matter for option demands and prices. Indeed, Bollen and Whaley (2004) 
find that demand pressures associated with various option series matter for implied volatility.  
However, theoretical option pricing models typically do not have any role for investor expectations, 
even though they provide an elegant framework of analysis. It seems that the challenge is to 
incorporate investor expectations in the elegant option pricing framework with the goal of 
increasing the explanatory power of the models while preserving the elegance of the framework. The 
idea of analogy making provides a tool to do just that.  
 Analogy making approach is inspired by the well-known practice of experienced market 
professionals to consider a call option to be a surrogate for the underlying asset. An analogy maker 
is a subjective expected utility maximize who considers a call option to be a surrogate for the 
underlying asset. Earlier research has shown that it provides a unified explanation for a number of 
puzzles in equity and commodity markets (see Siddiqi (2014), and Siddiqi (2015)).  
In this article, the approach is extended to currency options. The approach leads to an 
analogy based currency option pricing formula which contains the Garman-Kohlhagen formula as a 
special case corresponding to the complete absence of the forward discount bias. That is, if investor 
expectations are random and in line with the forward rate, the Garman-Kohlhagen formula is 
obtained. However, if they are biased as suggested by the observed forward discount bias, the smile 
is generated. Hence, the analogy formula not only provides an explanation for the implied volatility 
smile in currency options, but also shows that the smile can be considered a manifestation of the 
forward discount bias in currency options. Ability to provide an explanation for a wide variety of 
phenomena across diverse markets is a testament to the power of the analogy approach. 
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Appendix A 
     
 
                                                                                                                      (A1) 
From Ito’s Lemma: 
       
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                       (A2) 
Substituting (A2) in (A1) and simplifying leads to: 
  
  
   
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                         (A3) 
(A3) is the analogy based PDE for a currency call option with the boundary condition: 
                  
 
Appendix B 
Start by making the following transformations in (A3): 
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It follows, 
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
  
 
   
   
   
 
  
  
  
 
Plugging the above transformations into (A3) and writing    
    
  
,    
   
  
, and    
   
  
we get: 
  
  
 
   
   
       
  
  
                                                                                                          
With the boundary condition/initial condition: 
                                             
To eliminate the last two terms in (B1), an additional transformation is made: 
                    
It follows, 
  
  
                
  
  
 
   
   
                   
  
  
       
   
   
 
  
  
                
  
  
 
Substituting the above transformations in (B1), we get: 
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                              (B2) 
Choose    
     
 
 and    
      
 
        . (B2) simplifies to the Heat equation: 
  
  
 
   
   
                                                                                                                                                         
With the initial condition: 
              
                         
   
       
   
         
The solution to the Heat equation in our case is: 
       
 
    
   
      
 
  
 
  
           
Change variables: 
    
   
 , which means:    
   
   
. Also, from the boundary condition, we know 
that             .  Hence, we can restrict the integration range to   
  
   
 
       
 
   
   
  
    
   
  
           
 
 
 
   
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
  
           
        
Complete the squares for the exponent in   : 
    
 
         
  
 
  
 
 
   
         
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
       
 
 
   
 
 
     
We can see that       and   does not depend on  . Hence, we can write: 
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A normally distributed random variable has the following cumulative distribution function: 
     
 
   
   
  
   
 
  
 
Hence,    
       where    
 
   
   
 
         
Similarly,      
       where    
 
   
   
 
         and   
   
 
   
      
 
 
The analogy based European currency call pricing formula is obtained by recovering original 
variables: 
                     
                
Where    
           
  
 
      
     
        
   
 
 
     
  
 
      
     
 
 
